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The iron law of oligarchy is a political theory, first developed by the German syndicalist sociologist Robert Michels in his 1911 book, Political Parties. It states that all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic or autocratic[citation needed] they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop into oligarchies. The reasons for this are the technical indispensability of leadership, the tendency of the leaders to organize themselves and to consolidate their interests; the gratitude of the led towards the leaders; and the general immobility and passivity of the masses.
Contents [hide]
1 History
2 Reasons
3 Implications
4 Examples and exceptions
5 Criticism
6 See also
7 Notes
8 References
9 Further reading
10 External links
[edit]History

Robert Michels was disturbed to find that, paradoxically, the socialist parties of Europe, despite their democratic ideology and provisions for mass participation, seemed to be dominated by their leaders, just like the traditional conservative parties.
Studying political parties, he concluded that the problem lay in the very nature of organizations. Modern democracy allowed the formation of organizations such as political parties, but as such organizations grew in complexity, they became less and less democratic. Michels formulated the "Iron Law of Oligarchy": "Who says organization, says oligarchy."[1][2]
At the time Michels formulated his Law, he was an anarcho-syndicalist.[2] He later became an important ideologue of Benito Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy.[citation needed]
[edit]Reasons

Michels stressed several factors that underlie the Iron Law of Oligarchy. Darcy K. Leach summarized them briefly as: "Bureaucracy happens. If bureaucracy happens, power rises. Power corrupts."[2]
Any large organization, Michels pointed out, is faced with problems of coordination that can be solved only by creating a bureaucracy. A bureaucracy, by design, is hierarchically organized to achieve efficiency—many decisions have to be made daily that cannot efficiently be made by large numbers of people. The effective functioning of an organization therefore requires the concentration of much power in the hands of a few. Those few, in turn—the oligarchy—will use all means necessary to preserve and further increase their power.[1][2]
This process is further compounded, as delegation is necessary in any large organization, as thousands—sometimes hundreds of thousands—of members cannot make decisions via participatory democracy. This has been dictated by the lack of technological means for large numbers of people to meet and debate, and also by matters related to crowd psychology, as Michels argued that people feel a need to be led. Delegation, however, leads to specialization—to the development of knowledge bases, skills and resources among a leadership—which further alienates the leadership from the rank and file and entrenches the leadership in office.
Bureaucratization and specialization are the driving processes behind the Law. They create a specialized group of administrators in a hierarchical organization, which in turn leads to the rationalization and routinization of authority and decision-making, a process described first and perhaps best by Max Weber, later by John Kenneth Galbraith, and to a lesser and more cynical extent by the Peter Principle.
The organizational characteristics that promote oligarchy are reinforced by certain characteristics of both leaders and members of organizations. People achieve leadership positions precisely because they have unusual political skill; they are adept at getting their way and persuading others of the correctness of their views (see charismatic authority). Once they hold high office, their power and prestige is further increased. Leaders have access to, and control over, information and facilities that are not available to the rank-and-file. They control the information that flows down the channels of communication. Leaders are also strongly motivated to persuade the organization of the rightness of their views, and they use all of their skills, power and authority to do so.[1]
By design of the organization, rank and file are less informed than their "superiors." Finally, from birth, people are taught to obey those in positions of authority. Therefore the rank and file tend to look to leaders for policy directives and are generally prepared to allow leaders to exercise their judgment on most matters.
Leaders also have control over all very powerful negative and positive sanctions to promote the behavior that they so do desire. They have the power to grant or deny raises, assign workloads, fire, demote and — that most gratifying of all sanctions — the power to promote. Most important, they tend to promote junior officials who share their opinions, with the result that the oligarchy becomes self-perpetuating. Therefore the very nature of large-scale organization makes oligarchy within these organizations inevitable. Bureaucracy, by design, promotes the centralization of power in the hands of those at the top of the organization.[1]
[edit]Implications

The "iron law of oligarchy" states that all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic or autocratic[citation needed] they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies, thus making true democracy practically and theoretically impossible, especially in large groups and complex organizations. The relative structural fluidity in a small-scale democracy succumbs to "social viscosity" in a large-scale organization. According to the "iron law," democracy and large-scale organization are incompatible.
Robert Struble, Jr. argues, however, that a rapid rotation in office can mitigate, or even nullify, the "iron law" in the legislatures/parliaments of large nations.[3]
[edit]Examples and exceptions

An example that Michels used in his book was Germany's Social Democratic Party.[2]
The size and complexity of a group or organization is important to the Iron Law as well. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Green Party of Germany made a conscious effort to try and break the Iron Law.[4] Anyone could be or could remove a party official. There were no permanent offices or officers. Even the smallest, most routine decisions could be put up for discussion and to a vote. When the party was small, these anti-oligarchic measures enjoyed some success. But as the organization grew larger and the party became more successful, the need to effectively compete in elections, raise funds, run large rallies and demonstrations and work with other political parties once elected, led the Greens to adapt more conventional structures and practices.
One of the best known exceptions to the iron law of oligarchy was the now defunct International Typographical Union, described by Seymour Martin Lipset in his 1956 book, Union Democracy.[5]
Lipset suggests a number of factors that existed in the ITU that are allegedly responsible for countering this tendency toward bureaucratic oligarchy. The first and perhaps most important has to do with the way the union was founded. Unlike many other unions (e.g., the CIO's United Steel Workers of America, USWA, and numerous other craft unions) which were organized from the top down, the ITU had a number of large, strong, local unions who valued their autonomy, which existed long before the international was formed. This local autonomy was strengthened by the economy of the printing industry which operated in largely local and regional markets, with little competition from other geographical areas. Large locals continued to jealously guard this autonomy against encroachments by international officers. Second, the existence of factions helped place a check on the oligarchic tendencies that existed at the national headquarters. Leaders that are unchecked tend to develop large salaries and a more affluent lifestyle that makes them unwilling to go back to their previous jobs. With a powerful out faction ready to expose profligacy, no leaders dared create sumptuous personal remuneration. These two factors are quite compelling.
Lipset and his collaborators also cite a number of other factors which are specific to craft unions in general and the printing crafts in particular, including the homogeneity of the membership, with respect to their work and lifestyles, their identification with their craft, their more middle class lifestyle and pay. For this latter point he draws upon Aristotle who argued that a democratic polity was most likely where there was a large, stable middle class, and the extremes of wealth and poverty were not great. Finally, the authors note the irregular work hours which led shopmates to spend more of their leisure time together. These latter factors are less persuasive, since they do not apply to many industrial forms of organization, where the greatest amount of trade union democracy has developed in recent times.[6]
[edit]Criticism

Critics have challenged the iron law of oligarchy and its underlying assumptions. Orthodox Marxists[who?] dispute whether increasing bureaucracy means increased power for the bureaucrats.[citation needed] Others[who?] questioned whether power corrupts and leadership becomes unaccountable to the masses. Some[who?] have also claimed that small organizations with little bureaucracy should be able to avoid the iron law, which Michels claimed is unavoidable for all organizations.[2]
[edit]See also

Coordinatorism
Iron law of institutions
Public Choice
[edit]Notes

^ a b c d Frank W. Elwell, Max Weber's Home Page "A site for undergraduates" at Rogers State University]. Last accessed on 27 May 2006
^ a b c d e f Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy Across Organizational Forms, Sociological Theory, Volume 23, Number 3, September 2005 , pp. 312-337(26). IngentaConnect
^ Robert Struble, Jr., Treatise on Twelve Lights, (TeLL, inc., 2005, 2009), chapter seven, "Rotation in Office".
^ Whatever happened to the German Greens? - Red Pepper
^ Citation Classics Commentary on Union DemocracyPDF (254 KiB), Seymour Martin Lipset, 20/1988. Last accessed on 16th September 2006
^ Lipset's Union Democracy After 40 Years